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NFL STADIUMS AND ANTITRUST: YESTERDAY,
TODAY AND TOMORROW
INTRODUCTION
Vince Lombardi once said that there are three important things in
life: family, religion and the Green Bay Packers.' The truth of the
matter is that this holds true to football fans across the nation, and any
team in the National Football League ("NFL") could be substituted
for the Green Bay Packers in Mr. Lombardi's statement. The NFL's
television ratings, game attendance and revenues suggest it is the most
popular sports league in the United States.2 However, this popularity
has not come without its attendant share of criticism, especially when
team relocation is involved. In the past fifteen years, nearly all of the
NFL's member clubs have sought new or renovated stadiums, funded
in large part by public dollars, and have threatened to leave their
home city in order to have their demands met.
Perhaps the most striking example of such a scenario occurred in
1984, when the NFL's Colts moved to Indianapolis after over thirty
years of playing in Baltimore.3 The Colts' departure came after years
of failed negotiations with the city about the Colts' asserted need for a
new stadium.4 The most stunning aspect of the departure was the way
in which it was accomplished. On the day of the move, eminent do-
main legislation, which could have taken the team from its owner,
Robert Isray, was pending and could have become law within the next
twenty four hours.5 Accordingly, the owner decided to move before
the legislation could become law. However, Isray thought that if they
began the move before 5 p.m., the owners of the stadium would at-
tempt to lock the Colts out. 6 With these time constraints in mind, the
Colts' accomplished their move under cover of night, employing a
small fleet of Mayflower moving trucks and a small group of Colts'
management and employees.7 The move shocked not only the City of
1. Vince Lombardi, in QUOTABLE MEN OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 213 (Jessica Allen ed.,
Bill Alder Books 1999)
2. Michael Cunningham, NFL Players at Bottom Of Pro Pay Scale: Owners Resist Guaranteed
Contracts, EDMONTON JOURNAL (Alberta), March 2, 2004, at D4.
3. Ken Murray, Dark details readily recalled 10 years after Colts' move, THE BALTIMORE SUN,
March 29, 1994, IC.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
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Baltimore and NFL fans, but the team's players and personnel as
well.8
Six cities have lost NFL teams since 1983. Many more have suf-
fered threats to leave by team ownership. This trend of teams relocat-
ing is often credited 9 to the landmark case of L.A. Memorial Coliseum
Commission v. NFL ("Raiders I").1o Indeed, when the Colts left Balti-
more, owners of NFL teams voted to take no action, citing the multi-
million dollar verdict they suffered in the Raiders I case for trying to
stop the Raiders from moving from Oakland to Los Angeles."
In 1978, when the Los Angeles Rams left their city and stadium and
moved to Anaheim, California, 12 the Rams' former stadium, Los An-
geles Memorial Coliseum ("Coliseum"), was left without a tenant. 13
The Coliseum began to negotiate with other NFL teams in the hope
that it could convince a team to relocate. 14 Rule 4.3 of the NFL's con-
stitution, however, proscribed any team from changing locations with-
out the unanimous approval of the owners of the other teams in the
league.' 5 Claiming that Rule 4.3 was anticompetitive, Coliseum
brought an antitrust suit against the NFL. 16 This suit would be dis-
missed because, at the time, there was no NFL team committed to
moving to Los Angeles.' 7
The threat of litigation over Rule 4.3 caused the NFL to change its
relocation rule to require only three-fourths of member clubs' votes to
approve franchise transfer to a different city.'8 Nevertheless, when
the Oakland Raider's owner, Al Davis, committed to move his team
to Los Angeles, the controversy was renewed after the other NFL
team owners voted 22-0 against allowing Davis to move his team.19 A
8. Ken Murray, Dark details readily recalled 10 years after Colts' move, THE BALTIMORE SUN,
March 29, 1994, 1C.
9. See Katherine C. Leone, No Team, No Peace: Franchise Free Agency In the National Foot-
ball League, 97 COLUM. L. Ri v. 473, (1997).
10. L.A. Mem'l Coliseum Comm'n v. Nat'l Football League, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984).
11. Robert Thomas Jr., Colts Move to Indianapolis is Announced, THE NEW YORK TIMES,
March 30, 1984, 23A.
12. See L.A. Mem'l Coliseum Comm'n v. Nat'l Football League, 726 F.2d 1381, 1384 (9th Cir.
1984).
13. Id. at 1384.
14. Id. at 1384.
15. Id. at 1385.
16. Id. at 1385.
17. L.A. Mem'1 Coliseum Comm'n v. Nat'l Football League, 726 F.2d 1381, 1385 (9th Cir.
1984).
18. Id. at 1385.
19. Id. at 1385.
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jury found the NFL liable for antitrust violations, and the court im-
posed monetary penalties in excess of fifty million dollars.20
To some, the reaction to the case was that the little guy won and
that a monopolist was being punished for its behavior. Many critics
point out, however, that what happened was really a loss for the lit-
tlest guy of all-the consumer-and, in the case of publicly financed
stadiums, the taxpayer.21 The real winners, they argue, were the NFL
team owners, who had now struck a blow against the NFL's ability to
stop them from relocating their teams. The loss for the NFL gave
owners a newfound power, because ownership threats to relocate
were now more credible than before. No longer could local govern-
ments expect significant support from the NFL in resisting ownership
plans for relocation. In negotiations with local governments, the own-
ers' new power translated into more dollars promised for new or re-
furbished stadiums for their teams.
Raiders I had long lasting implications, 22 but some more recent anti-
trust actions against the NFL may be curing the wounds the NFL in-
curred in its battle against the Raiders over two decades ago. The
most recent action against the NFL ended quietly in February of 2006
when an action by the taxpayers of Hamilton County, Ohio, was dis-
missed based on statute of limitations violations. In that case, taxpay-
ers had brought suit against the NFL's Cincinnati Bengals ("Bengals")
because they had come to believe that the team had attempted to
"shake down" the taxpayers, not for its economic survival, as the team
had claimed, but to enrich the team's owners. 23
The death of the Hamilton County case provides an opportunity to
reflect on the current state of stadium negotiations between NFL
teams and their actual or potential home cities. This note first looks at
the history of stadium financing in professional football, then dis-
cusses some other factors that contribute to the present state of af-
fairs. The second part of this note looks at some prior antitrust
actions involving the NFL and team relocation. The next section turns
to the case between Hamilton County and the Cincinnati Bengals. Fi-
20. Id. at 1359.
21. See Katherine C. Leone, No Team, No Peace: Franchise Free Agency In the National Foot-
ball League, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 473, (1997).
22. Id.
23. This may or may not be true. From financial disclosures the NFL was forced to make in
1999, it seems that the NFL has come to rely on its sports subsidies to the extent that they must
be subsidized, in part, to remain competitive, both financially and on the field, with other teams.
However, this is not discussed in this note. For more information on the disclosures. see Alan
Abrahamson & Sam Farmer, NFL Ledgers Reveal Profits Depend on New Stadiums, LA TIMES,
May 13, 2001.
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nally, the note looks forward, discussing some current issues and what
the Hamilton County case portend about the future.
II. How WE ARRIVED AT WHERE WE ARE TODAY
A. The History of Stadium Finance
The growth of professional sports near the turn of the nineteenth
century gave rise to the need for stadiums.24 The NFL was originally
founded as the American Professional Football Association in 1920,25
while Major League Baseball ("MLB") was formed after the National
and American Leagues combined in 1903.26
Stadiums for these fledgling leagues were originally privately fi-
nanced and owned. 27 The entrepreneurial owners of the professional
sports teams needed a venue to put on their "exhibitions of sport." 28
At the time, sports had not yet captured the nation's attention in the
way they have today.29 This practice of private financing continued
until 1924. In that year, Los Angeles, competing to host the 1924
Olympics, funded the construction of the L.A. Coliseum through tax-
payer dollars as a means to attract the Games to the city.3 0 It was the
first stadium funded in such a way, and it started a trend that contin-
ues almost unabated today. 31 Shortly after the L.A. Coliseum was
built, Chicago and Cleveland built stadiums in an attempt to attract
the Olympics. 32
Although politicians promised that the stadiums would pay for
themselves,3 some, such as the mayor of New York in 1947, warned
of the dangers of subsidizing privately owned sports teams, claiming
that if professional sports leagues had their stadiums subsidized by the
City, all types of businesses would demand similar concessions. 4 Nev-
24. Raymond J. Keating , Sports Pork, The Costly Relationship between Major League Sports
and Government, PoLcy ANALYSIS, Volume 339, April 5, 1999. Available at http://www.cato.
org/pubs/pas/pa339.pdf.
25. National Football League, Hoover's In Depth Company Records, Mar. 16, 2005, available
in WESTLAW. 2005 WLNR 4049155.
26. Major League Baseball Player's Association, Hoover's In Depth Company Records, Feb.
19, 2005, available in WESTLAW, 2005 WLNR 2575548.
27. Keating, supra note 24.
28. Id.
29. See Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore v. Nat'l League of Prof'l Baseball Clubs et al., 259
U.S. 200, 42 S.Ct. 456, 66 L.Ed. 898 (1922).
30. Keating , supra note 24.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Brent Bordson, Public Sports Stadium Funding: Communities Being Held Hostage By Pro-
fessional Sports Team Owners. 21 HAMLINE L. REv. 505 (1998).
34. Keating . supra note 24.
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ertheless, by the 1950's, taxpayer funded stadiums had become
commonplace.35
Today, city, county and state governments employ a multitude of
creative taxes to pay for stadiums. Approximately fourteen billion
taxpayer dollars have been spent over the last twenty years building
such stadiums and arenas. 36 Some use an alcohol and cigarette tax,
otherwise known as a "sin tax."3 7 Others have used hotel taxes and
rental car taxes, thereby placing the burden of stadium finance on
tourists and business travelers.38 Milwaukee imposed a five county-
wide sales tax to pay for its stadium.39 In Florida, the NFL's Miami
Dolphins received a $60 million sales tax rebate for their stadium. 40
Hamilton County voters in Ohio approved a half-cent sales tax in-
crease in 1996 to pay for Paul Brown Stadium and MLB's Cincinnati
Reds' Great American Ball Park. 41 Similarly, the Dallas Cowboys and
the Kansas City Chiefs recently became the beneficiaries of voter-ref-
erendum-approved fractional sales tax increases to fund a new sta-
dium in Arlington, Texas, and to refurbish Arrowhead Stadium in
Kansas City, Missouri. 42
B. Self Imposed Scarcity
Many argue that the NFL benefits from a self-imposed scarcity of
teams-that by having fewer teams than the market demands, NFL
teams are able to threaten relocation when bargaining for new facili-
ties. In No Team, No Peace: Franchise Free Agency in the National
Football League,43 Katherine C. Leone argues that the NFL's control
over professional football give it the bargaining power it needs to
-elicit wide-ranging concessions from local governments to the detri-
35. Id.
36. Ronald W. Powell, Commercial model may be stadiums' future, THE SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIBUNE, December 29, 2006.
37. Zachary A. Phelps, Stadium Construction For Professional Sports Stadia: Reversing the
inequities Through Tax Incentives, 18 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 981, 991 (2004).
38. Id. at 991.
39. Id. at 992.
40. Keating , supra note 24.
41. Cindi Andrews, TrusteeFiles SuitTo Bench, THE CINCINNATI ENOQUIRER, March 30. 2004 at
3C.
42. Andra Ahles, Stadium plans are kept secret, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, September 8,
2006 (Arlington, Texas voters approved a half-cent sales tax increase to contribute up to $325
million for a new stadium for the Dallas Cowboys); Randy Covitz, Teams get split decision; Vote
cements Hunt's legacy as Cheifs will stay at Arrowhead, THE KANSAS CITY STAR, April 5, 2006
(In Kansas, Jackson County taxpayers approved a three-eighth sales tax increase to help pay for
the $575 million overhaul of Arrowhead and Kauffman Stadiums).
43. Leone, supra note 21.
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ment of taxpayers and fans." 4 4 This negotiating power, she asserts,
comes as a result of the NFL's special treatment under the federal
antitrust laws and the NFL's control of the number of franchises it
allows to enter the league.4 5 Ms. Leone cites a study that argues that
in 1990, when the league had a total of 28 teams, it could have sup-
ported 42.46 This contention was based on the fact that Buffalo was
the NFL team with the smallest market and there were 14 larger mar-
kets at the time.47 Perhaps this idea of an artificial scarcity is sup-
ported by the fact that Los Angeles, the second largest city in the
nation, with the second largest national television market, has gone 11
seasons without a NFL franchise in its city.48 As Jerry Richardson, the
owner of the Carolina Panthers, said in 1995: "[w]e have the most
popular sport franchise in the world and there's only thirty of them.
There are a lot of places that want one." 4 9
This is not to say that every market that could possibly support a
team should receive one. There are reasons to restrict entry. In Mid-
South Grizzlies v. National Football League,50 a case about a team that
was not allowed in the NFL, the NFL produced several reasons for
not allowing the Grizzlies into the league. It argued that allowing an-
other team in the league would create scheduling difficulties. 51 Fur-
ther, it argued that ongoing labor disputes and other unresolved
litigation made it unwise to allow additional teams into the league at
the time. 52 An interesting aspect of the Mid-South Grizzlies decision
was it pointed out that allowing another team in the league would not
necessarily benefit the consumer-that it would not necessarily bring
down prices through increased competition.53 For example, adding a
new franchise in Los Angeles would not bring down ticket prices in
Chicago. Competition would only increase, the court noted, if the
prospective team were to enter a market in which it would actually
compete with other teams for tickets, local broadcast rights, or the
like. 54
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Leone, supra note 21, at n. 44.
48. Art Spander, Oakland, San Francisco about to get shafted, INSIDE BAY AREA (California)
November 10, 2006.
49. Hamilton County Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Nat'l Football League, 445 F. Supp. 2d 835,
846 (D. Ohio 2006).
50. 720 F.2d 772 (C.A.Pa.,1983).
51. Mid-South Grizzlies v. Nat'l Football League 720 F.2d 772, 784 -786 (C.A.Pa..1983).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 787.
54. Id.
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While this observation may be true to some extent, it should not
detract from the fact that when there is a vacant city, NFL owners are
quick to use them for leverage in stadium negotiations. Should a city
want to retain its NFL team, that team, leveraging its scarcity, shows
that there are other cities willing to build and publicly subsidize a sta-
dium in order to attract them. In turn, franchises demand that either
their current city pay the bill for new or upgraded facilities, or face the
prospect of losing its NFL team.
This bargaining power is multiplied by the fact that the NFL is usu-
ally dealing with elected officials-politicians afraid of losing a sports
team while they are in office. The politicians are up against other lo-
cal governments, willing to invest substantial sums of money in the
hope they can attract a team to their city, so they can enjoy the status
of a "major league city."55 The fact is, many cities, if not all of them,
consider their professional sports teams as a source of civic pride they
are unwilling to do without. 56 Six cities have lost NFL teams since
1983; Oakland in 1983, Baltimore in 1984, St. Louis in 1988, Los An-
geles, which lost two teams in 1995, Cleveland in 1997, and Houston in
1997.57 All but Los Angeles have franchises again, and Los Angeles is
certainly not missing an NFL team for lack of trying; billionaires, poli-
ticians and movie stars have been trying to get the NFL back in Los
Angeles ever since the city lost its teams.58 These losses have not
come without attendant prices, either. Three years after St. Louis lost
the Cardinals for failing to allocate $120 million for a new stadium, the
voters approved $280 in public funding for a new stadium. 59 Oakland,
Baltimore and Houston each increased their public funding offers by
one third after losing their franchises.60
The situation faced by the Hamilton County taxpayers in dealing
with the Bengals seems to serve as a good example of stadium negoti-
ations in the NFL. Sometime around 1993, Mike Brown, the owner of
the Cincinnati Bengals, began to argue that in order to stay competi-
tive in the NFL his team would need a new stadium.61 "During a 1995
55. A Proposal for the Antitrust Regulation of Professional Sports. Boston U. Law Review,
October 1999 (79 B.U.L.Rev 889, 913s)
56. Phelps, supra note 37.
57. Jordan Rappaport & Chad Wilkerson, What are the benefits of hosting a major league
sports franchise?, EcONOMic REVIEW - FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY, First Quar-
ter 2001.
58. Sam Farmer, Pro Football in L.S. Back in Spotlight; As team owners meet in Philadelphia,
the jockeying for a stadium resumes, Los ANGELES TIMES, May 20, 2003.
59. Rappaport & Wilkerson, supra note 57.
60. Id.
61. Hamilton County Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Nat'l Football League, 445 F. Supp. 2d 835,
845 (D. Ohio 2006).
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owners' meeting held to discuss franchise movement, Mike Brown de-
clared that the City of Cincinnati had breached its lease agreement by
tendering $167,000 in concession receipts from a game one week late,
allowing the Bengals to seek relocation." 62 A month later, Brown said
that if a new stadium was not forth-coming, moving to Los Angeles
was a "real possibility." 6 3
Baltimore, in the meantime, had offered to build a $200 million sta-
dium for the Bengals and offered to pay $44 million in assured in-
come.64 "Armed with this offer, Mike Brown levied an ultimatum on
June 24, 1995: If Cincinnati and Hamilton County did not agree to a
new stadium deal within five days, the Bengals would begin relocation
negotiations with Baltimore." 6 5 Not long after, the Bengals had the
stadium deal they sought from Cincinnati.
C. Revenue Sharing
The NFL's revenue sharing scheme has widely been credited as a
reason for the NFL's success. By sharing revenue, small-market
teams, such as the Green Bay Packers and Buffalo Bills, have the
money to compete with big-market teams, such as the New York Gi-
ants, in terms of attracting top tier talent that helps maintain a com-
petitive balance around the league and, as a result, continued interest
from fans around the nation in their local team. Of over five billion
dollars in annual revenue, approximately three billion dollars is dis-
tributed equally among the NFL's member clubs.66 This means that
each team starts out with a base of about $100 million from the NFL's
television and radio contracts, national sponsorships, and portion of
each team's ticket revenues.67 With so much shared revenue, it is
often what teams do with their unshared revenue that makes a team a
financial success.68
An NFL team can direct unshared money to many causes. For ex-
ample, an NFL team with more revenue can attract high-end players,
allowing it to bring in more fans, compete for championships and sus-
tain profitability. 69 It is certainly common for teams to claim that they
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Mark Maske & Thomas Heath, NFL's Economic Model Shows Signs of Strain, WASHING-
TON POST, January 8, 2005, Al.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Alan Abrahamson & Sam Farmer, NFL Ledgers Reveal Profits Depend on New Stadi-
ums, LA TIMES, May 13, 2001.
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need to increase independent revenues to be competitive; discussing
the relationship between exempt revenue and team performance,
Kansas City Chiefs' President Carl Peterson said "[t]he disparity is
real" and "it is widening."7 0 Some statistics support this conclusion.
Of the eleven teams with the lowest revenue in 1999, only three made
the playoffs.7 1 In the four years prior to 1999, three out of four teams
that made the Super Bowl had recently moved into new or renovated
stadiums.72
These claims, however, can be refuted by other statistics. The
Washington Redskins, who have one of the highest revenue streams in
the NFL, at approximately $245 million in 2004, have seldom seen a
winning season since Dan Snyder took over in 1999.73 Eight of the
teams in the twelve team playoff field in the 2004-2005 season were
ranked in the bottom half of revenue production in the league the
previous year, 74 and the owner of the Houston Texans, Bob McNair,
believes just the opposite of Carl Peterson of the Chiefs, and claims
that there is no correlation between high-revenue producing teams
and winning percentages.75
Regardless of the statistics, many teams focus on the structure of
their stadiums as a way to garner higher independent revenue streams.
Under the NFL's revenue sharing agreement, team owners have con-
siderable incentive to put their team in a stadium with more skyboxes,
club seats and personal seat licenses because they are exempt under
the NFL revenue sharing agreement. 76 Typically, luxury boxes will sell
for $50 thousand to $175 thousand per season, and new stadiums will
have hundreds of them.77 In addition to luxury seating, teams may be
offered valuable assets not counted in the revenue sharing agreement,
such as ownership of practice facilities or even the stadium itself.7 8
This scheme of revenue sharing obviously gives a team incentive to
seek a new stadium. From a fan and taxpayer perspective, the reve-
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Mark Maske & Thomas Heath. NFL's Economic Model Shows Signs of Strain, WASHING-
ION POST, January 8, 2005, Al.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Mildred Wigfall Robinson, Public Finance of Sports Stadia: Controversial but Permissi-
ble. .Time for Federal Income Tax Relief for State and Local Tax Payers, 1 VA. SPORTS & ENT.
L.J. 135, 144 (2002).
77. Alan Abrahamson & Sam Farmer, NFL Ledgers Reveal Profits Depend on New Stadi-
ums, LA TIMES. May 13. 2001.
78. M. COzZILLIO ET AL., SPORTS LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS 566 (Carolina Academic
Press 1997).
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nue sharing agreement is poorly modeled because it has given NFL
teams a greater incentive to seek new and improved facilities. If these
exempt revenues were shared, one could argue, each team's incentive
to seek a new stadium would be reduced, by a certain degree, because
the teams would not reap the same benefits they do under the current
scheme.
III. ANTITRUST LAW AND THE NFL
A. L.A. Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL
As discussed in the introduction, L.A. Memorial Coliseum Comm'n
v. NFL ("Raiders I")79 was perhaps the most famous, or infamous,
antitrust case involving team relocation. The case left the NFL unsure
of its ability to prevent team owners from relocating their franchises.
In Raiders I, a jury found that the NFL had violated the antitrust
laws, for which damages of nearly fifty million dollars were imposed
against the NFL. The antitrust liability was based on the NFL's rules
regarding team relocation, which required three-fourths of member
clubs' votes to allow a team to transfer a franchise to a different city.80
The jury found this rule was an anticompetitive agreement under the
antitrust laws.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit's opinion reviewed the NFL's reloca-
tion rule under the Rule of Reason. Normally, it noted, an agreement
between competitors to divide territories would be per se illegal.81
However, the court found, the unique structure of the NFL prevented
such an application of the per se rule, and it opted to use the Rule of
Reason instead.82 The court used the Rule of Reason to examine the
NFL's relocation rule and determine if it reasonably served the legiti-
mate concerns of the parties or instead allowed them to take in exces-
sive profits at the public's expense.83 As discussed above, the Court
affirmed the judgment entered by the trial court, leaving the NFL
wounded for years to come.
79. L.A. Mem'1 Coliseum Comm'n v. Nat'l Football League, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984).
80. Id. at 1385.
81. Id. at 1392.
82. Id. at 1392.
83. Id. at 1392.
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B. St. Louis Convention & Visitors Comm'n v. National
Football League
In St. Louis Convention & Visitors Comm'n v. National Football
League,8 4 the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
was faced with a situation where a team had actually moved. In the St.
Louis case, the plaintiff claimed that, as a result of an anti-movement
"atmosphere" in the NFL, it was forced to accept unfavorable lease
terms with the NFL's Rams.
In 1988, St. Louis' football team, the Cardinals, moved to Phoenix. 5
The Missouri legislature gave the St. Louis Convention & Visitors
Commission ("CVC") the job of finding a new team by 1995.86 The
city built a new football stadium in downtown St. Louis to attract a
team. In 1993, after failing to attract one of the NFL's expansion
franchises, CVC began to court established NFL teams, eventually
reaching an agreement with the Los Angeles Rams. 7
When the proposed relocation was presented to the NFL member
clubs, they initially voted against it. After further negotiations, the
Rams agreed to pay the NFL fee of $29 million for moving, of which
the CVC would pay $20 million. 8 While St. Louis was happy to have
an NFL team again, the honeymoon did not last long. In the first year
of play, the CVC was unable to meet its financial obligations.89 It sub-
sequently filed suit against the NFL and its member clubs, agreeing to
split any verdict or settlement with the Rams. 90
CVC's theory was that the NFL violated antitrust laws because its
relocation rule, which provides that three-fourths of the member clubs
must approve a relocation before it could take place, and "the accom-
panying guidelines [for voting under Rule 4.3], and their application
over time functioned as an agreement among the league and the indi-
vidual teams to restrain relocations, creating an atmosphere which de-
terred teams from moving and therefore from bidding on the [football
84. 154 F.3d 851 (8th Cir. 1998).
85. St. Louis Convention & Visitors Com'n v. Nat'l Football League 154 F.3d 851 (8th Cir.
1998).
86. Idat 853.
87. Id. at 853.
88. Id. at 853.
89. Id.at 853.
90. St. Louis Convention & Visitors Com'n v. Nat'l Football League 154 F.3d 851, 853 (8th
Cir. 1998).
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stadium's] lease."91 The CVC claimed damages of $77 to $122
million.92
Prior to trial, the court held that "CVC would . . . have to offer
proof that the alleged conspiracy to suppress movement of teams in
fact caused the absence of competing bids on the Trans World Dome
lease before a jury would be permitted to decide whether harm to
competition, caused by Article 4.3 and its enforcement, outweighed
the positive effects on competition." 9 3 This was because, the district
court reasoned, "CVC's claim was unlike cases alleging damage from
a direct application of a regulation," and there was nothing to suggest
there was an explicit ban or limit on competitive bidding for leases. 94
After the CVC presented its case, the NFL moved for judgment as a
matter of law on CVC's claim that the NFL had violated Section 1 of
the Sherman Act. 9 5 Granting the NFL's motion, the court found that
CVC had not presented any evidence that Rule 4.3 or its guidelines
"actually had caused league teams other than the Rams to refrain
from competitive bidding on the Trans World Dome lease."96
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit stated that "analysis of whether a re-
striction's harm to competition outweighs any procompetitive effects
is necessary if the anticompetitive impact of a restraint is less clear or
the restraint is necessary for a product to exist at all." 9 7 To prevail in
its case, the court stated, CVC would have had to prove "(1) there was
an agreement among the league and member teams in restraint of
trade; (2) it was injured as a direct and proximate result; and (3) its
damages are capable of ascertainment and not speculative." 98 This ev-
idence would have to exclude the possibility that the NFL and its
member teams acted independently. 99 The court found CVC failed to
do this at trial. With respect to the causation element that the district
court actually rested its judgment on, the Eighth Circuit found that
CVC would have had to show that prior suppression of team move-
91. St. Louis Convention & Visitors Com'n v. Nat'l Football League 154 F.3d 851, 856 (8th
Cir. 1998). In the wake of the L.A. Memorial Coliseum Commission case, the NFL had adopted
'objective" guidelines that NFL owners were to follow when deciding to vote on a proposed
relocation of another member club. Id. at n. 3. These guidelines were suggested by the Ninth
Circuit so that the NFL could prevent future scrutiny of the NFL's relocation rule. Id. at n. 3.
92. St. Louis, 154 F.3d at 856.
93. Id. at 857.
94. Id. at 857.
95. Id. at 858-859.
96. Id. at 859.
97. St. Louis Convention & Visitors Com'n v. Nat'l Football League 154 F.3d 851, 861 (8th
Cir. 1998).
98. Id. at 862.
99. Id. at 862.
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ment and the anti-movement atmosphere "effectively prevented all
other teams from dealing with CVC" on the lease. 00 Again, this was
something CVC had failed to show at trial. 101
C. Cases Compared
The cases of St.Louis and Raiders 1102 are interesting to compare in
that they both dealt with stadium relocation, and in both the stadium
to which a team wanted to move was the plaintiff, yet the outcomes
were completely different-mainly, one could argue, because of the
way the pleadings and theories of the case stood. In Raiders I, the
question was whether Rule 4.3 was anticompetitive; 0 3 in St. Louis, it
was not only Rule 4.3 that was questioned, but whether Rule 4.3 and
guidelines for voting under Rule 4.3 created an atmosphere in which
other teams did not even attempt to negotiate a lease with CVC.104
Thus, the CVC plaintiffs did not even have proof of an agreement in
their case.
According to the Eighth Circuit, the crucial difference between the
case before it and others was that CVC had not challenged a vote by
NFL team owners or a particular application of the NFL's rules.10 5
Further, it had obtained the team that it sought. CVC's complaint was
focused on market conditions and an atmosphere created by the
NFL's rules.10 6
In Raiders I, the court said that it was obvious that "the purpose of
Rule 4.3 was to restrain competition among the 28 [NFL] teams."10 7 It
then went on to consider whether the rule actually harmed competi-
tion or whether its procompetitive benefits outweighed any harm the
Rule caused because "some agreements which restrain competition
may be valid if they are 'subordinate and collateral to another legiti-
mate transaction and necessary to make that transaction effec-
tive.'"108 Much to CVC's chagrin, the court in St. Louis would never
reach this step in its analysis. In order to prove that the NFL was
100. Id. at 862.
101. Id. at 862.
102. 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984).
103. L.A. Mem'1 Coliseum Comm'n v. Nat'l Football League, 726 F.2d 1381. 1386 (9th Cir.
1984).
104. St. Louis Convention & Visitors Comn v. Nat'l Football League 154 F.3d 851, 856 (8th
Cir. 1998).
105. Id. at 861.
106. Id. at 861.
107. L.A. Mem'l Coliseum Comm'n v. Nat'l Football League, 726 F.2d 1381, 1395 (9th Cir.
1984).
108. Id.; internal quotes from United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271. 281-282
(6th Cir. 1898).
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acting pursuant to a conspiracy, CVC had to exclude the possibility
that other NFL teams were not bidding on the lease offered by the
CVC for independent reasons. 109 The court found that CVC failed to
prove the teams were acting pursuant to a conspiracy because they
failed to exclude the possibility of independent action.110
IV. THE HAMILTON COUNTY CASE
The controversy in Hamilton County Board of Commissioners v.
National Football League ("Hamilton County")1 1' stemmed from tax-
payer unhappiness with the terms of their lease, signed in 1997, for a
new stadium built for the Cincinnati Bengals.112 A series of news arti-
cles detailed just how good a deal the Bengals got on their new sta-
dium and just how much the taxpayers were actually paying for it. For
example, an article published in May of 1998 in the Cincinnati Busi-
ness Courier began by stating "[w]hen the Cincinnati Bengals signed a
preliminary lease agreement for a new stadium in September of 1996,
team owner Mike Brown joked that his team had finally found a
squad it could beat: Hamilton County." 113 That was followed by a
quote from an economics professor who opined that "Hamilton
County [was] left with one of the most heavily exploitative leases in
the NFL." 114 An analysis by the Cincinnati Business Courier showed
the Bengals' twenty-six year lease gave the team approximately ninety
percent of the nearly two billion dollars in revenue that the stadium
would produce and required the team to pay only about three and a
half percent of the approximately one billion dollars in predicted ex-
penses for the stadium, while leaving Hamilton County with deficits
from five to seven million dollars per year. 15 Another article,116 pub-
lished in the Los Angeles Times in May 2001, revealed the high profit
margins of NFL teams, calling into question the tactics the Bengals
used in negotiating their stadium deal.' 17 Not long after, the Hamilton
County taxpayers filed suit.
109. Id. at 861.
110. Id. at 861.
111. 445 F. Supp. 2d 835 (S.D. Ohio 2006).
112. Hamilton County Bd. of Comm'rs v. Nat'1 Football League, 445 F. Supp. 2d 835, 838
(S.D. Ohio 2006).
113. Dan Monk, Expert: Stadium lease 'Exploitative', CINCINNATI Bt SINESS COURIER, May
22, 1999.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Alan Abrahamson & Sam Farmer, NFL Ledgers Reveal Profits Depend on New Stadi-
ums. LA TIMES, May 13. 2001.
117. Monk, supra note 114.
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The lawsuit accused the NFL and the Bengals of, among other
things, using their monopoly over professional football to extort huge
subsidies from the county taxpayers to build Paul Brown Stadium.118
Specifically, the Hamilton County taxpayers alleged that the NFL's
strict control over the number of franchises in the league, its prohibi-
tion against public ownership and its disregard of guidelines instituted
to prevent antitrust violations gave teams tremendous leverage to ex-
act excessive monies for stadium deals.' 19
The case was ultimately dismissed on the grounds that it was filed
after the statute of limitations passed. The plaintiff filed its case
against the NFL and its member clubs in May of 2003.120 The injury,
however, occurred on May 29, 1997, when the lease for Paul Brown
stadium was executed. 121 Thus, the defendants alleged in their motion
for summary judgment, unless something, such as a fraudulent con-
cealment of the plaintiff's cause of action against the defendants was
present, the statute of limitations had run out four years after the exe-
cution of the contract, on May 29, 2001, and the plaintiff's cause of
action was no longer viable. 122 The court had found that the league
and team owner had possibly made misrepresentations about the Ben-
gals' financial position, and let the case proceed into discovery. 123
While the case proceeded in discovery, the named plaintiff was
switched from the Hamilton County taxpayers to the Hamilton
County Board of County Commissioners ("*Board"). 124 Interestingly,
this substantially changed the nature of the proceedings. The question
about fraudulent concealment was no longer about what was con-
cealed from the taxpayers, but what was concealed from the Board. 125
The discovery process revealed that the Board was very well informed
of the team's financial situation at the time the lease was signed in
1997.
In ruling that no fraud had occurred, and, consequently, that the
statute of limitations had passed, the court found it significant that
several of the commissioners were aware the Bengals were a highly
118. Dan Horn, Portune Sues Bengals, NFL, THE CINCINNATI ENOUIRER, Saturday. May 17,
2003.
119. See Complaint, Portune v. Nat'l Football League, No. 1-03 355 (S.D. Ohio 2003).
120. See Defendants' First Motion for Summary Judgment (Antitrust Statute of Limitations)
at 1, No. 1-03 355 (S.D. Ohio 2003).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Hamilton County Bd. of Comm'rs v. Nat'l Football League. 445 F. Supp. 2d 835 (S.D.
Ohio 2006).
124. Id.
125. Id.
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profitable venture throughout the lease negotiations and, thus, would
have known about the alleged fraud prior to and at the time of the
lease signing.12 6 The Board was also aware of the antitrust litigation
stemming from the relocation of the Rams to St. Louis.12 7 One of the
commissioners, at a hearing prior to the execution of the lease, stated
that he had talked to Mayor Daley of Chicago and Mayor Schmoke of
Baltimore, who expressed the sentiment that the NFL was doing noth-
ing less than "extorting" money from them.128 These things, the court
found, made the Board aware of exactly what was going on and that
the NFL and the Bengals made no misrepresentations during the par-
ties' negotiations for the stadium. 129 The court concluded its opinion
by saying:
It may even be that this lease was the consequence of unlawful an-
ticompetitive behavior by the Bengals and the NFL. Despite these
truths-if they be truths-this Board cannot advance stale claims.
Whether for good or ill, prior members of the Board negotiated the
instant lease with the Bengals fully aware of the possibility that the
team and the NFL allegedly wielded unlawful antitrust power to ob-
tain favorable terms under the lease. They simply failed to object or
to otherwise advance a claim . . . until it was lost to the passage of
time.130
V. TODAY ANDTOMORROW
The NFL is dynamic and constantly changing. What litigation has
transpired in the past does not necessarily foretell the future. For ex-
ample, in March of 2006, the NFL and the NFL's Player's Association
reached an agreement on their collective bargaining agreement that
included an approval of a concept of heightened revenue sharing.131
More revenue sharing, among other changes, are issues that may have
a strong impact on the NFL and its member clubs' behavior and, con-
sequently, antitrust implications in future lawsuits.
A. Emerging Trends
The approval of heightened revenue sharing could, in theory, en-
sure that parity in NFL competition continues into the future. At the
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Hamilton County Bd. of Comm'rs v. Nat'1 Football League, 445 F. Supp. 2d 835 (S.D.
Ohio 2006).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. UPI NEwsTRACK SPORTS. March 9, 2006.
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time of this publication, however, the NFL's team owners have not
reached a final agreement on the new revenue sharing structure. Sev-
eral NFL member clubs are opposed to heightened revenue sharing.
Led by Dan Snyder of the Washington Redskins and Jerry Jones of
the Dallas Cowboys, NFL owners are claiming that the current reve-
nue structure takes away from NFL teams' incentive to maximize
profit independently. 1 3 2 Stadium naming rights is one example of op-
portunities that some NFL teams have failed to take advantage of.
The Arizona Cardinals recently sold the naming rights to their sta-
dium for approximately $150 million over twenty years. 133 The Hous-
ton Texans sold their naming rights for a whopping $300 million over
thirty two years in 2002.134 Conversely, the Cincinnati Bengals and the
Buffalo Bills, both relatively small market teams, have not sold the
naming rights to their stadiums. 135 Owners opposed to heightened rev-
enue sharing believe that before they are forced to give up a larger
percentage of their team's revenue to smaller-market teams, those
teams should exploit opportunities to increase their revenues
independently.
While a new or refurbished stadium can increase a team's revenue,
the construction of new or refurbished stadiums has an interesting
side effect. It feeds a cycle. Building a stadium increases other teams'
need to have a new or refurbished stadium. When a new stadium is
built that brings in higher revenues, those revenues count toward the
total amount of revenue shared among the league's players, so it in-
creases each NFL team's labor costs.1 36 For example, the new stadium
for the NFL's New York Giants and Jets is expected to cost each team
in the NFL an additional two million dollars per year in labor costs.' 3 7
Thus, when one team builds a stadium that increases revenues, it
places a higher burden on all teams in the league and creates the need
for other teams to increase their revenues.
Revenue sharing is not the only thing changing. Stadiums have be-
come significantly more expensive than they were in the past. The
joint stadium planned by the Jets and Giants as well as the new sta-
dium for the Dallas Cowboys have price tags hovering around one
132. Mark Maske & Thomas Heath, NFL's Economic Model Shows Signs of Strain, WASH-
INo rON POST, January 8, 2005, Al.
133. Rick Gosselin, Chargers' Martyball awaits the Chiefs. THE DALLAS MORNING NEwvS. Oc-
tober 19, 2006.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Daniel Kaplan, Bills, Bengals dissent on $300M N.J. stadium, BUFFALO BUSINESS FIRST,
December 18, 2006.
137. Id.
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billion dollars. 138 Most cities simply cannot afford to allocate so much
money to an NFL team. 139 The NFL's New England Patriots' new sta-
dium was financed mainly by private monies, and the Jets/Giants pro-
posed stadium will also be privately financed. 14 0 In turn, teams are
turning to other revenue sources, such as commercial developments
around their new stadiums, to decrease the up-front costs associated
with stadiums. 141 While this may be the result of the increased costs of
stadiums, the fact that the public has become wary of financing team
stadiums most likely plays a role in the decision as well. 142 For exam-
ple, Seattle voters recently passed an initiative to block public monies
from being spent on stadiums to support professional sports
franchises. 143
The changes in revenue sharing and the way stadiums are financed
may have a big impact on antitrust litigation in the future. For exam-
ple, the NFL has persistently argued, albeit unsuccessfully, that it is a
single entity for purposes of antitrust, which makes it exempt from
liability under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 144 The cornerstone of a
Section 1 claim is an allegation that two or more distinct entities en-
tered into an understanding or agreement to take joint action against
a plaintiff to achieve an unlawful objective. 145 Accordingly, if the NFL
were found to be a single entity for antitrust purposes, it would be
exempt from this section of the Sherman Act.
As the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals stated in Mt. Pleasant v.
Associated Elec. Coop., Inc.:
A conglomeration of two or more legally distinct entities cannot
conspire among themselves if they pursue the common interests of the
138. Sally Claunch. 1-30 upgrades set to start soon, FORT WORTH STAR TELEGRAM, January 5,
2007 (stadium in Arlinton, Texas, for the Cowboys); Mark Maske, Two Teams, One Major Re-
quest; Giants, Jets Seek Loan From NFL for New Stadium, THE WASHINGTON POST, November
18, 2006.
139. Ronald W. Powell, Commercial model may be stadiums' future, THE SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIBUNE, December 29, 2006.
140. Chistopher Carey, Two Privately Financed Stadiums May Hold Lessons for Cardinals;
Homes of Patriots and Giants Have Features that Cut Risk, Saved Money. ST. Louis POsT-Dis-
PATCh, September 29, 2002 (Patriot's used private money to build their new stadium with limited
public money for road and sewer work); Mark Maske. Two Teams, One Major Request; Giants,
Jets Seek Loan From NFL for New Stadium, THE WASHINGTON PosT, November 18, 2006.
141. Ronald W. Powell, Commercial model miay be stadiums future, THE SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIBUNE. December 29, 2006.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. See L.A. Mem1 Coliseum Comm'n v. Nat'l Football League, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir.
1984); St. Louis Convention & Visitors Com'n v. Nat'l Football League 154 F.3d 851 (8th Cir.
1998): Sullivan v. Nat'l Football League, 34 F.3d 1091 (1st Cir. 1994); Murray v. Nat'l Football
League, 1996 WL 363911 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
145. Murray, 1996 WL 363911 at *19.
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whole rather than interests separate from those of the group itself be-
cause such coordination does not represent a sudden joining of two
independent sources of economic power previously pursuing separate
interests, it is not activity that warrants § 1 scrutiny . . . The thrust [of
case law] is that economic reality, not corporate form, should control
the decision of whether related entities can conspire.146
Should NFL teams begin sharing more revenue and become more
interdependent, the NFL will strengthen its argument that it acts as
one single economic entity that is exempt from antitrust regulation
under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
The fact that teams are privately financing stadiums may also have a
large impact on antitrust claims related to stadiums in the NFL.
Teams that own their stadiums need not fear retaliation from the pub-
lic under the antitrust laws. Should private financing by the team be-
come the norm, antitrust litigation on this front could become a relic
of the past.
B. Looking to the Future
1. Introduction
The NFL certainly had reason to regain a bit of the swagger it lost
as a result of the Raiders I decision after its success in the St. Louis
case as well as in Warnock v. National Football League, in which a
court found a taxpayer did not have standing to challenge Allegheny
County's expenditures and lease arrangements on Heinz Stadium, dis-
cussed infra. Indeed, the defendants in the St. Louis case were
awarded nearly $100,000 in costs incurred as a result of CVC's suit.14 7
And the NFL certainly has reason to be happy the Hamilton County
case was dismissed. Had the case gone to trial and Hamilton County
taxpayers received a favorable verdict, it would have been a water-
shed moment for stadium negotiations. In theory, the case could have
reversed what many found wrong with the Raiders I decision. Rather
than giving the victory to the NFL owners, it would have gone to the
taxpayers of Hamilton County or, at least, Hamilton County's trea-
sury. Some estimated the damages of the case could have approached
one billion dollars.14 8 However, before the NFL rests it must consider
an important implication of the Hamilton County case. The fact that a
146. Mt. Pleasant v. Associated Elec. Coop., Inc., 838 F.2d 268, 274-275 (8th Cir. 1988) (inter-
nal punctuation omitted).
147. St. Louis Convention & Visitors Comm'n v. Nat'l Football League, 1998 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 22219 (D. Mo. 1998).
148. Dan Horn. Bengals Suit Estimate Soars, THE CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, February 12, 2005.
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taxpayer was found to have standing in Hamilton County is substan-
tial, and it could breed similar litigation against the NFL in the future.
2. Standing in Hamilton County and Warnock
The case brought by Hamilton County taxpayers was unique be-
cause it withstood an initial challenge to dismiss for lack of standing.
A case involving similar allegations, Warnock v. National Football
League,149 was dismissed in 2005 for lack of standing. Warnock, filed
by a taxpayer in Allegheny County against the NFL and its member
teams, similarly alleged antitrust violations in obtaining funding for
the Pittsburgh Steelers' Heinz Field.
Both the Warnock and Hamilton County courts agreed on the broad
doctrines of standing. Generally, a person cannot bring a lawsuit
claiming to have suffered injury solely in his or her capacity as a tax-
payer. 150 Article III of the Constitution limits the "judicial power" of
the United States to the resolution of "cases" and "controversies" 151
and in order to bring a lawsuit, an individual must have standing-a
blend of Constitutional requirements and prudential
considerations.152
In order to satisfy Article III of the Constitution, the plaintiff must
show that he or she has personally suffered some actual or threatened
injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the defendant.153
The Supreme Court has held that failure to allege any actual injury
beyond a generalized grievance common to all taxpayers is not suffi-
cient to warrant taxpayer standing. 154 Additionally, the plaintiff must
generally assert his own legal interests and not those of third
parties. 155
The Warnock court assumed, for purposes of the motion to dismiss,
that there was an injury-that the taxpayer's dollars were misspent,
and that a favorable decision would redress that injury.156 What the
Warnock court could not find was that the plaintiff's alleged injury
was "fairly traceable to the conduct" of the NFL and its member
149. 356 F. Supp. 2d 535 (W.D.Pa. 2005).
150. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State,
Inc. 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
151. Id. at 471.
152. Id. at 471.
153. Gladstone Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979).
154. American Jewish Congress v. Bost, 2002 WL 31973707, *2 (W.D. Tex. 2002).
155. Gladstone Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979): Vill. of Arlington
Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252. 263 (1977).
156. Warnock v. Nat'l Football League, 356 F. Supp. 2d 535. 544 (W.D.Pa. 2005).
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clubs-the defendants.15 7 The court stated "[p]laintiff in effect alleges
that defendants committed an antitrust violation that caused Alle-
gheny County to spend tax dollars in order to keep the Steelers in
Pittsburgh." 158 The court held there was a missing link in the chain of
causation, that the defendants were not the entity that distributed the
plaintiff's tax dollars.'5 9 If the court allowed the case to proceed, it
reasoned, any municipal taxpayer could bring suit against a private
entity that receives tax dollars for some alleged violation of federal
law, which would flood the Federal Courts with cases. 16 0 The govern-
ment entity, the court held, was the missing link; because the govern-
mental entity was not a defendant in the suit, the injury was caused by
a third party not before the court. 161 The Third Circuit affirmed the
lower court's ruling, agreeing the pivotal issue in the case was the di-
rectness of the harm the victim suffered. 16 2 It found that the govern-
mental entities responsible for distributing the tax dollars would have
been the appropriate defendants. 163
Both the Warnock and Hamilton County courts considered the issue
of municipal taxpayer standing, the doctrine which suggests a munici-
pal taxpayer may have sufficient standing to assert a claim based
solely on the litigant's status as a taxpayer. 164 In Warnock, the court
found that in order to assert municipal taxpayer standing the party
must be (1) suing a governmental entity; and (2) requesting equitable
relief.165 The Hamilton County court found that in order to assert mu-
nicipal taxpayer standing, the plaintiff had to allege a "direct, measur-
able appropriation of the municipality that dramatically affects the
public fisc, establishing a "good-faith pocketbook injury" sufficient to
provide standing.166
Under the framework it established for municipal taxpayer stand-
ing, the Warnock court found the plaintiff did not meet the require-
ments necessary for standing. The court found the plaintiff was not
able to satisfy either of the two requirements it found necessary to
establish standing, because the plaintiff was not suing a government
157. Id. at 544.
158. Id. at 545 (emphasis in original).
159. Id. at 545.
160. Id. at 545.
161. Warnock v. Nat'l Football League, 356 F. Supp. 2d 535, 545 (W.D.Pa. 2005).
162. Warnock v. Nat'1 Football League, 154 Fed. Appx. 291, 294 (3rd Cir. 2005).
163. Id. at 294.
164. Warnock v. Nat'1 Football League, 356 F. Supp. 2d 535, 540 (W.D.Pa. 2005).
165. Id. at 541.
166. Feb. 9, 2004 Order, Ohio ex. rel Davis v. Nat'l Football League, No. 1-03 355 (S.D. Ohio
2004).
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entity and was not seeking equitable relief.167 Rather, the plaintiff was
suing thirty private entities for damages in excess of $600 million 68
The plaintiff in Hamilton County did not even initially argue that he
enjoyed standing under the municipal taxpayer doctrine. Rather, the
court took it upon itself to consider the matter.169 The court began its
analysis of the doctrine by discussing the same seminal case on munic-
ipal taxpayer standing cited by the Warnock court, Frothingham v.
Mellon,170 which basically stands for the proposition that while a fed-
eral taxpayer does not have standing to challenge federal expendi-
tures, a municipal taxpayer may sue to enjoin the illegal use of the
municipalities monies.'7 1 It then noted that the Supreme Court has
reaffirmed the municipal taxpayer rule in cases such as Flast v. Co-
hen,172 in which the Supreme Court reasoned the rule was justified
because the taxpayer's relation to a municipal treasury was much
greater than the taxpayer's relation to the federal treasury. 73
The court then turned to Sixth Circuit decisions on the matter, such
as the case of Hawley v. City of Cleveland,174 in which the Sixth Cir-
cuit allowed an action by municipal taxpayers to proceed against the
City of Cleveland for renting space to the diocese at a reduced rate,
causing the City to lose revenue. 75 Further, the court noted that in
United States v. City of New York,176 the Second Circuit found plain-
tiffs had standing in a case against New York City and a number of
private entities.177 In City of New York, the Second Circuit found that
a taxpayer's relationship to a municipality was "direct and immediate"
so that the taxpayer suffered injury when a measurable amount of
funds are misappropriated. 178 The Hamilton County court concluded
by finding the plaintiff could "establish standing if they can 'show the
challenged activity involves a measurable appropriation or loss of rev-
167. Warnock v. Nat'l Football League, 356 F. Supp. 2d 535, 546 (W.D.Pa. 2005).
168. Id. at 546.
169. Feb. 9, 2004 Order, Ohio ex. rel Davis v. Nat'l Football League, No. 1-03 355 at 42 (S.D.
Ohio 2004).
170. 262 U.S. 477 (1923).
171. Feb. 9, 2004 Order, Ohio ex. rel Davis v. Nat'1 Football League, No. 1-03 355 at 44 (S.D.
Ohio 2004).
172. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
173. Feb. 9, 2004 Order, Ohio ex. rel Davis v. Nat'1 Football League, No. 1-03 355 at 45 (S.D.
Ohio 2004).
174. 773 F.2d 736 (6th Cir. 1985).
175. Feb. 9, 2004 Order, Ohio ex. rel Davis v. Nat'l Football League, No. 1-03 355 at 47 (S.D.
Ohio 2004).
176. 972 F.2d 464 (2nd Cir. 1992).
177. Feb. 9, 2004 Order, Ohio ex. rel Davis v. Nat'l Football League, No. 1-03 355 at 49 (S.D.
Ohio 2004).
178. Id. at 49-50.
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enue and a direct dollars-and-cents injury."1 7 9 The court found the
plaintiff's complaint fulfilled this requirement because of the $400 mil-
lion appropriated to construct the stadium.s 0
Although the Hamilton County court found the plaintiff had stand-
ing, it continued its analysis because there are heightened standing
requirements for antitrust litigants. In Warnock, the District Court
found that the plaintiff failed to meet the normal requirements for
standing, so it was unnecessary for the court to consider the height-
ened requirements.18' In Hamilton County, the court noted five fac-
tors the courts use to determine if antitrust injury exists, (1) the causal
connection and whether the harm was intended by the defendant; (2)
the nature of the plaintiff's injury and whether the plaintiff was a con-
sumer or competitor in the relevant market; (3) the directness or indi-
rectness of the injury, and the related inquiry of whether damages
were speculative; (4) the potential for duplicative recovery; and (5)
the existence of more direct victims of the alleged antitrust
violations.182
The court concluded that the plaintiff sufficiently pleaded the first
four factors. It noted the plaintiff alleged that the defendants "were
able to coerce the construction of a new stadium and unjustifiably
favorable lease terms solely because of the monopoly that they enjoy
over professional football."8 3 The court thought it would have been
difficult for the plaintiff to have alleged a more direct connection. 18 4
The court also found the damages were not speculative because the
amount paid by the taxpayers was known and economic models were
capable of forecasting what price would have been paid for the sta-
dium in a competitive market. 85 Further, the court found there was
no risk of complex apportionment because the plaintiff was asking
that the lease be voided and that all damages flow directly to the
county. 186
The court then addressed the defendant's argument that there were
more direct victims and that the plaintiff had not suffered injury to her
179. Id. at 50.
180. Id. at 50.
181. Warnock v. Nat'l Football League, 356 F. Supp. 2d 535, n. 7 (W.D.Pa..2005).
182. Feb. 9, 2004 Order, Ohio ex. rel Davis v. Nat'l Football League, No. 1-03 355 at 53 (S.D.
Ohio 2004).
183. Id. at 54.
184. Id. at 54.
185. Id. at 54.
186. Id. at 54.
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business or property.187 The court found that even if the defendant's
argument were true, the list of five factors was not conjunctive, and by
fulfilling the first four factors the plaintiff had sufficiently pleaded an-
titrust injury to give her standing. 88 Accordingly, the court found that
the Hamilton County plaintiff had antitrust standing. The court ex-
pressly admitted that its decision could lead to more cases of a similar
nature but found that the Supreme Court's decision in Frothingham
had foreseen this but found it acceptable.189 Accordinly, Frothingham,
and not the court's decision on the matter before it, was the root cause
of such concerns.190
3. Opposing Decisions
The Hamilton County decision and the Warnock decision, affirmed
by the Third Circuit, stand in opposition to each other. The Warnock
court's finding that standing in municipal taxpayer suits is not estab-
lished unless the party is (1) suing a governmental entity; and (2) re-
questing equitable reliefl91 went unaddressed in Hamilton County.
The only case the Hamilton County court noted that involved private
entities was United States v. City of New York,192 which, in addition to
the private entities, included the City of New York and other govern-
mental entities as defendants. The Warnock court's finding was based
on the fact that all of the cases it reviewed, including those relied on
for the Hamilton County court's decision, had both a governmental
entity as a defendant and injunctive or equitable relief sought as a
remedy.1 9 3
While the Warnock decision has some initial appeal, the court ulti-
mately put form over function, and should have found the plaintiff in
that case had standing. A footnote in the Warnock decision remarked
that it was "interesting" the governmental bodies involved in the sta-
dium agreement, Allegheny County and the Sports & Exhibition Au-
thority, declined to be added as plaintiffs in the action against the
NFL and its member teams.19 4 It also noted that they had not been
added as defendants.19 5 The fact the government could have been a
187. Feb. 9, 2004 Order, Ohio ex. rel Davis v. Nat'l Football League, No. 1-03 355 at 55 (S.D.
Ohio 2004).
188. Id. at 55.
189. Id. at 65.
190. Id. at 55.
191. Warnock v. Nat'l Football League, 356 F. Supp. 2d 535. 541 (W.D.Pa. 2005).
192. 972 F.2d 464 (2nd Cir. 1992).
193. Warnock v. Nat'1 Football League, 356 F. Supp. 2d 535, 541 (W.D.Pa.,2005).
194. Id. at n. 4.
195. Id. at n. 4.
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plaintiff or a defendant in the case highlights the problem with the
Warnock court's decision.
Had the government been a plaintiff, the standing question before
the court would be moot, as would the question of municipal taxpayer
standing. Accordingly, what was pivotal in the Warnock case was the
fact that the plaintiff failed to add the government as a defendant-
and failed to seek equitable remedies. This should not have con-
trolled the outcome of the case.
The plaintiff in Hamilton County sought to have changes in the
lease, an equitable remedy, in conjunction with its plea for damages.
The benefits of these remedies were not to accrue to the plaintiff-tax-
payer personally, but to the governmental entities the taxpayer al-
leged were the victims of the antitrust laws. Accordingly, naming the
governmental entities serves as a mere formality when the same result
accrues with or without the government named as a defendant. The
Warnock plaintiffs could have sought the same remedy. That court's
worry that allowing the case to proceed would proliferate lawsuits was
ill founded. It was not the Warnock case itself that the court was re-
ally worrying over, but the doctrine of municipal taxpayer standing.
which remains viable. Accordingly, the Warnock court's worry was
misplaced, and the case should not have been dismissed.
VI. CONCLUSION
As this note heads to publication, the City of San Francisco is facing
the possibility of losing its beloved 49ers to nearby Santa Clara after it
failed to reach a deal to build a new stadium at Candlestick Point.19 6
Today, the team is seeking $160 million from Santa Clara in order to
help finance a new $850 million stadium there.197 Fans, needless to
say, are upset at the thought of losing their team, and they continue to
look for solutions. Coming to aid the fans, United States Senator Di-
anne Feinstein introduced a bill that would allow the NFL member
clubs to say "no" to other team owners trying to move their team by
eliminating their fear of antitrust reprisals. 98 The bill states "[i]t shall
not be unlawful by reason of any provision of the antitrust laws for the
National Football League to enforce rules authorizing the member-
ship of the league to decide that a member club of such league shall
196. Patrick Hodge, City must kick in $160 million in cash to score new 49ers stadium. SAN
FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, B7, April 25, 2007: Phil Matier, Andrew Ross, 49ers say they are moving
to Santa Clara. SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, B, November 9, 2006.
197. Id.
198. Football Fairness Act of 2007, S. 249, 110th Cong. (2007).
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not be relocated." 199 Nevertheless, locals remain skeptical that such a
bill would offer a real solution to the problem.200 Indeed, the 49ers do
not think that it would stop them from moving to Santa Clara.201
Whether Senator Feinstein's bill is mere posturing or an earnest at-
tempt to eliminate the plague of franchise movement in the last thirty
years remains to be seen. As noted previously, the NFL is a dynamic
organization that is always changing, and the past does not necessarily
foretell the future. While the 20th Century bore witness to the birth
of professional sport in the United States and its subsequent attach-
ment to the taxpayer funded stadium, the beginning of the 21st Cen-
tury seems to be marked by a change in the way sports leagues and
publicly financed stadiums will operate.
Changing revenue sharing schemes among the teams, ballooning
costs of stadiums, private financing, the threat of municipal taxpayer
standing in antitrust suits and, possibly, federal legislation, could
change the complexion of antitrust liability the NFL and its member
teams face. In the meantime, fans will continue to long for the day
that the team they root for today will be the same team, in the same
location, the next generation of fans roots for, making a football team,
like family and religion in Vince Lombardi's world, things that simply
do not change.
Brion Doherty*
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